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Abstract: We study two cooperative solutions of a market with indivisible goods
modeled as a generalized assignment game: Set-wise stability and Core. We establish
that the Set-wise stable set is contained in the Core and contains the non-empty
set of competitive equilibrium payo¤s. We then state and prove three limit results
for replicated markets. First, the Set-wise stable set of a two-fold replicated market
already coincides with the set of competitive equilibrium payo¤s. Second, the sequence
of Cores of replicated markets converges to the set of competitive equilibrium payo¤s
when the number of replicas tends to innity. Third, for any number of replicas there
is a market with a Core payo¤ that is not a competitive equilibrium payo¤.
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1 Introduction
We study two cooperative solutions for a class of markets with indivisible goods modeled as
generalized assignment games. Shapley and Shubik (1972) dened an assignment game as
a market where each seller owns one indivisible object and each buyer, who wants to buy at
most one object, has valuations over all objects. An assignment is a description of deliveries
of objects from sellers to buyers and a price vector is a list of prices, one for each object.
A competitive equilibrium of a market is a price vector and a feasible assignment at which
each seller maximizes revenues, each buyer maximizes net valuations, and markets clear.
Shapley and Shubik (1972) showed that the set of competitive equilibria is non-empty, com-
petitive equilibrium assignments are optimal (the rst welfare theorem holds), any optimal
assignment is part of a competitive equilibrium with any of the competitive equilibrium
price vectors (a strong version of the second welfare theorem holds without requiring any
redistribution of the initial endowments), and the set of competitive equilibrium payo¤s
coincides with the Core of a naturally associated TU game (no enlargement or replica of
the market is required for their coincidence).
We consider a generalized assignment game representing a market with a given number
of indivisible units of di¤erent goods, where sellers may own di¤erent units of each of
the goods and buyers, who may want to buy several units of di¤erent goods up to an
exogenous total amount, have constant marginal valuations of each good. Jaume, Massó,
and Neme (2012) extend Shapley and Shubik (1972)s results for this generalized assignment
game. In particular, they show that the set of competitive equilibria is non-empty, it is
the Cartesian product of the set of competitive equilibrium price vectors and the set of
optimal assignments, the set of competitive equilibrium price vectors has a lattice structure
with the natural partial order of vectors  to be larger or equal than, and this lattice
structure is partly translated in a dual way to the sets of buyers and sellersutilities that
are attainable at competitive equilibria.
In this paper we study two di¤erent cooperative solutions for this class of markets and
their relationship with the set of competitive equilibrium payo¤s. The two solutions di¤er
on how a coalition of buyers and sellers can block a proposed payo¤ vector. Given an
assignment and a coalition of buyers and sellers, some of them may be buying or selling
some units of some goods to sellers or buyers outside the coalition. The notion of the Core
corresponds to the notion of blocking that requires that all members of the coalition have to
break all exchanges performed with all agents outside the coalition and buy or sell only with
1
members within the coalition. In contrast, the concept of Set-wise stability corresponds to
the notion of blocking that admits that members of the coalition may completely or partly
keep their exchanges performed with non-members.
The Set-wise stability notion is closer to the already well established notion of stabil-
ity applied to ordinal many-to-one matching models. For instance, Roth and Sotomayor
(1990) analyze this model and its applications to college admission problems and to labor
markets for medical interns assuming that a hospital in a blocking coalition can maintain
its relationships with interns outside the coalition. There is no reason to expect that the
hospital, in order to make an o¤er to a doctor in the blocking coalition, will have to cancel
the contracts it has with other doctors it has been already assigned to.
Since Set-wise blocking is easier than Core-wise blocking, the Set-wise stable set is a
subset of the Core. We show here that the non-empty set of competitive equilibrium payo¤s
is contained in the Set-wise stable set. Hence, the Set-wise stable set as well as the Core
are non-empty. Moreover, we exhibit a simple market showing that these inclusions may
be strict.
The main contribution of the paper is to answer a¢ rmatively the following question. Do
the Core and the Set-wise stable set converge to the set of competitive equilibrium payo¤s
when the market becomes large? The question is relevant because competitive equilibrium
requires price-taking behavior which only makes sense when individual quantity decisions
are perceived by each agent as being negligible. To create a setting where price-taking
behavior is meaningful we follow the well established tradition in Economics to enlarge the
environment by replicating the market. We rst show that the Set-wise stable set already
coincides with the set of competitive equilibrium payo¤s for a two-fold replicated market
(Theorem 1). We also show that the Core converges to the set of competitive equilibrium
payo¤s when the number of replica tends to innity (Theorem 2). Finally, we show that
for any number of replicas there is a market with a Core payo¤ that is not a competitive
equilibrium payo¤ (Theorem 3). Thus, the notion of Set-wise stability is much closer (not
only in terms of set-wise inclusion) to competitive equilibrium than the notion of Core.
There are many other papers that recently have studied the relationship between the set
of competitive equilibrium payo¤s and alternative cooperative solutions in many-to-one or
many-to-many generalizations of Shapley and Shubik (1972)s assignment game. Sotomayor
(1992 and 1999a) study a many-to-many assignment game with two nite and disjoint sets
of agents. Each agent from each side can form a maximal number of partnerships with the
agents from the other side. Each partnership generates a total payo¤ that may be shared
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by its two members. Observe that in this extension partnerships are binary; specically,
if a buyer and a seller form a partnership they can exchange just one indivisible unit of
the good held by the seller. Sotomayor (1992) proves that all pair-wise stable assignments
are optimal and Sotomayor (1999a) shows that the set of pair-wise stable payo¤s has a
complete and dual lattice structure. Sotomayor (1999b) proposes the notion of Set-wise
stability for the former model and shows that the pair-wise stable set (that may be empty)
is a subset of the Core. Camiña (2006) studies a market with one seller, that owns a given
number of (potentially) di¤erent objects, and several buyers who want to buy at most one
object. She shows that the Core and the Set-wise stable set coincide, the set of competitive
equilibrium payo¤s is non-empty and it is a subset of the Core. Moreover, she shows that
the Core has a complete lattice structure with the partial order coming from comparing
buyerspayo¤ vectors with the partial order  and this structure is not dual.
Sotomayor (2007) studies a generalized assignment game similar to ours but with two
important di¤erences: (i) sellers only own units of a unique good and each good is only
owned by a particular seller and (ii) buyers may want to buy several units but partnerships
are also binary because buyers are not interested in buying more than one unit from each
seller. She shows that the set of competitive equilibrium payo¤s is a non-empty, complete
and dual lattice. Sotomayor (2009 and 2011) extends Sotomayor (1992 and 1999a) and con-
sider a time-sharing assignment game where both buyers and sellers own a xed amount of
a divisible good (labor time) and to form a partnership a buyer and a seller have to agree
to contribute each with the same amount of labor time and to share, in a particular pro-
portion, the amount of money that is proportionally obtained from the jointly contributed
amount of labor time. Sotomayor (2009) studies di¤erent solution concepts for di¤erent
kinds of coalitional interactions. In particular, she shows the inclusion relationships that
hold among the non-empty sets of competitive equilibrium payo¤s, the Core, the Set-wise
stable set, the Strong stable set and the set of dual allocations. Moreover, she also shows
that some of these sets have a lattice structure. Sotomayor (2011) analyses the relationship
between the competitive equilibrium solution and a cooperative notion similar to Set-wise
stability that di¤ers from ours because agreements with non-members are rigid since they
are nullied once any of its terms is changed. Moreover, Sotomayor (2011) studies the
algebraic structure of these sets. Klaus and Walzl (2009) study several notions of Set-
wise stability for the ordinal many-to-many matching model with contracts under di¤erent
preference restrictions.
Milgrom (2009) introduces and studies the space of assignment messages to investigate
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(and solve) the di¢ culty that agents face when reporting their types (or valuations of
goods, or sets of goods) in some mechanism design settings. The model is very general
and contains as particular cases multi-unit auctions (with substitutable goods), exchange
economies, and integer assignment games. Milgrom (2009) focuses on the study of the
non-emptiness of the set of competitive equilibrium prices and its lattice structure but he
does not analyze any cooperative solution. Jaume, Massó, and Neme (2012) study using
linear programming the same model than the present one but they only focus on the study
of the Cartesian product and lattice structures of the set of competitive equilibria and the
corresponding sets of agentsutilities.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we dene a market. In Section 3, and
closely following Jaume, Massó, and Neme (2012), we dene a competitive equilibrium of a
market. In Section 4 we rst present the notion of Set-wise stability and show that the Set-
wise stable set contains the non-empty set of competitive equilibrium payo¤s. We dene,
for any positive integer , a  fold replica of a market and show in Theorem 1 that the Set-
wise stable set of a two-fold replicated market already coincides with the set of competitive
equilibrium payo¤s. We then present the notion of Core and show that it contains the set
of Set-wise stable payo¤s and in Theorem 2 we show that the limit of the sequence of the
Cores of replicated markets coincides with the set of competitive equilibrium payo¤s when
the number of replicas tends to innity. Finally, in Theorem 3 we show that for any number
of replicas there is a market with a Core payo¤ that is not a competitive equilibrium payo¤.
In Section 5 we discuss our main result and nish with nal remarks. An Appendix at the
end of the paper collects the proofs that have been omitted in the main text.
2 Preliminaries
A generalized assignment game (a market) consists of three nite and disjoint sets: the
set B = f1; :::; Bg of buyers, the set G = f1; :::; Gg of goods, and the set S = f1; :::; Sg
of sellers. We denote a generic buyer by i, a generic good by j, and a generic seller by
k. Buyers have a constant marginal valuation of each good. Let vij  0 be the monetary
valuation that buyer i assigns to each unit of good j; namely, vij is the maximum price that
buyer i is willing to pay for each unit of good j: Denote by V = (vij)(i;j)2BG the matrix of
valuations. We assume that buyer i 2 B can buy at most di 2 Z+nf0g units in total, where
Z+ is the set of non-negative integers. The strictly positive integer di should be interpreted
as a capacity constraint due to limits on is ability for storage, transport, etc. Denote by
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d = (di)i2B the vector of maximal demands. Each seller k 2 S has qjk 2 Z+ indivisible
units of each good j 2 G. Denote by Q = (qjk)(j;k)2GS the capacity matrix. We assume
that there is a strictly amount of each good; namely,
for each j 2 G there exists k 2 S such that qjk > 0: (1)
Let rjk  0 be the monetary valuation that seller k assigns to each unit of good j; that is,
rjk is the reservation (or minimum) price that seller k is willing to accept for each unit of
good j. Denote by R = (rjk)(j;k)2GS the matrix of reservation prices.
A market M is a 7-tuple (B;G;S; V; d; R;Q) satisfying condition (1). Shapley and
Shubik (1972)s (one-to-one) assignment game is a special case of a market where each
buyer can buy at most one unit, there is only one unit of each good, and each seller only
owns one unit of one of the goods; i.e., di = 1 for all i 2 B, G = S, and for all (j; k) 2 GS,
qjk = 1 if j = k and qjk = 0 if j 6= k.
An assignment for marketM = (B;G;S; V; d; R;Q) is a three-dimensional integer matrix
(i.e., a 3rd-order tensor) A = (Aijk)(i;j;k)2BGS 2 ZBGS+ describing a collection of deliver-
ies of units of the goods from buyers to sellers. Each Aijk should be interpreted as buyer i
receives Aijk units of good j from seller k.We often omit the sets to which the subscripts
belong to and write, for instance,
P
ijk Aijk and
P
iAijk instead of
P
(i;j;k)2BGS Aijk andP
i2B Aijk, respectively.
The assignment A is feasible for marketM = (B;G;S; V; d; R;Q) if each buyer i buys at
most di units and each seller k sells at most qjk units of each good j. We are only interested
on the following set of feasible assignments
fA 2 ZBGS+ j
P
jk Aijk  di for all i 2 B and
P
iAijk  qjk for all (j; k) 2 G  Sg:
For each (i; j; k) 2 B  G  S; let
 ijk =
(
vij   rjk if qjk > 0
0 if qjk = 0
(2)
be the per unit gain from trade of good j between buyer i and seller k. If seller k does not
have any unit of good j the per unit gain from trade of good j with all buyers is equal to
zero. The total gain from trade of market M = (B;G;S; V; d; R;Q) at assignment A is
TM (A) =
P
ijk  ijk  Aijk:
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Denition 1 A feasible assignment A is optimal for market M = (B;G;S; V; d; R;Q) if,
for any feasible assignment A0, TM(A)  TM (A0) :
Let F be the set of all optimal assignments for market M = (B;G;S; V; d; R;Q). The
set F is always non-empty.1 Denote by TM the total gain from trade of market M at any
optimal assignment.
3 Competitive Equilibrium
3.1 Denitions and Preliminaries
We dene a competitive equilibrium of marketM = (B;G;S; V; d; R;Q) by following Jaume,
Massó and Neme (2012). Assume buyers and sellers trade through competitive markets.
That is, there is a unique market (and its corresponding unique price) for each of the goods
and buyers and sellers are price-takers. Given a price vector p = (pj)j2G 2 RG+ sellers supply
units of the goods (up to their capacity) in order to maximize revenues at p and buyers
demand units of the goods (up to their maximal demands) in order to maximize the total
net valuation at p.
Supply of seller k: For each price vector p = (pj)j2G 2 RG+, seller k supplies of every good
j any feasible amount that maximizes revenues; namely,
Sjk(pj) =
8><>:
fqjkg if pj > rjk
f0; 1; :::; qjkg if pj = rjk
f0g if pj < rjk:
(3)
To dene the demands of buyers we need the following notation. Let p 2 RG+ be given
and consider buyer i. Let
r>i (p) = fj 2 G j vij   pj = max
j02G
fvij0   pj0g > 0g (4)
be the set of goods that give to buyer i the maximum (and strictly positive) net valuation
at p. Obviously, for some p; the set r>i (p) may be empty. Let
ri (p) = fj 2 G j vij   pj = max
j02G
fvij0   pj0g  0g (5)
1See Milgrom (2009) for a proof of this statement in a more general model. See Jaume, Massó and
Neme (2012) for a proof of the statement using only linear programming arguments in the same model as
the one studied here.
6
be the set of goods that give to buyer i the maximum (and non-negative) net valuation at
p. Obviously, for some p; the set ri (p) may also be empty. Obviously, for all p 2 RG+ and
all i 2 B,
r>i (p)  ri (p): (6)
Demand of buyer i: For each price vector p = (pj)j2G 2 RG+, buyer i demands any feasible
amounts of the goods that maximize the net valuations at p; namely,
Di(p) = f = (jk)(j;k)2GS 2 ZGS j (D.a) jk  0 for all (j; k) 2 G  S,
(D.b)
P
jk jk  di;
(D.c) r>i (p) 6= ; =)
P
jk jk = di; and
(D.d)
P
k jk > 0 =) j 2 ri (p)g:
Thus, Di(p) describes the set of all trades that maximize the net valuation of buyer i at
p: Observe that the set of trades described by each element in the set Di(p) give the same
net valuation to buyer i; i.e., i is indi¤erent among all trade plans  2 Di(p):
Let A be an assignment and let i be a buyer. We denote by A(i) = (A(i)jk)(j;k)2GS the
element in ZGS+ such that, for all (j; k) 2 G  S, A(i)jk = Aijk:
Denition 2 A competitive equilibrium of market M = (B;G;S; V; d; R;Q) is a pair
(p;A) 2 RG+  ZBGS+ such that A is a feasible assignment and:
(E.D) for each buyer i 2 B; A(i) 2 Di (p) ;
(E.S) for each good j 2 G and each seller k 2 S; PiAijk 2 Sjk (pj) :
The vector p 2 RG+ is a competitive equilibrium price of marketM = (B;G;S; V; d; R;Q)
if there exists a feasible assignment A such that (p;A) is a competitive equilibrium of market
M . Let P be the set of competitive equilibrium prices of market M: The set P is always
non-empty.2 For further reference, we state this fact without proof as a remark below.
Remark 1 The set of competitive equilibrium prices of any market is non-empty.
Moreover, by Proposition 4 in Jaume, Massó, and Neme (2012), the set of competitive
equilibria has a Cartesian product structure. We also state this fact without proof as a
remark below.
Remark 2 Let M = (B;G;S; V; d; R;Q) be a market. Then, (p;A) is a competitive
equilibrium of M if and only if p 2 P and A 2 F .
2For the proof of this statement in a more general model see Milgrom (2009), and for a proof in our
setting using only linear programming see Jaume, Massó and Neme (2009).
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3.2 The Set of Competitive Equilibrium Payo¤s
Let p 2 RG+ be a price vector andA a feasible assignment of marketM = (B;G;S; V; d; R;Q):
We dene the utility of buyer i 2 B at the pair (p;A) as the total net gain obtained by i
from his exchanges specied by A at price p. We denote it by ui(p;A); namely,
ui(p;A) =
P
jk
(vij   pj)  Aijk:
We dene the utility of seller k 2 S at the pair (p;A) as the total net gain obtained by k
from his exchanges specied by A at price p. We denote it by wk(p;A); namely,
wk(p;A) =
P
ij
(pj   rjk)  Aijk:
Given (p;A), denote by u(p;A) = (ui(p;A))i2B and w(p;A) = (wk(p;A))k2S the vector of
buyers and sellersutilities at (p;A), respectively. Let
CE = f(u;w) 2 RB  RS j there exists (p;A) 2 P  F s.t. (u;w) = (u(p;A); w(p;A))g
be the set of competitive equilibrium payo¤s of market M = (B;G;S; V; d; R;Q). However,
competitive equilibrium payo¤s are independent of the particular optimal assignment. To
see that, dene the mappings of per-unit gains () : RG+ ! RB and () : RG+ ! RGS as
follows. Let p 2 RG+ be given. For each i 2 B, dene
i(p) =
(
vij   pj if there exists j 2 r>i (p)
0 otherwise,
(7)
and for each (j; k) 2 G  S, dene
jk (p) =
(
pj   rjk if pj   rjk > 0
0 otherwise.
(8)
The number i(p) is the gain obtained by buyer i from each unit that he wants to buy at
p (if any) and the number jk(p) is the prot obtained by seller k from each unit of good
j that he wants to sell at p (if any).
Let p 2 P be a competitive equilibrium price of market M = (B;G;S; V; d; R;Q) and
let ((p); (p)) be its associated per unit gains. Dene (u(p); w(p)) 2 RB  RS by setting
ui(p) = di  i(p) for all i 2 B and (9)
wk(p) =
P
j2G
qjk  jk(p) for all k 2 S:
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By Lemma 6 in Jaume, Massó, and Neme (2012), the set of competitive equilibrium payo¤s
of market M can also be written as
CE = f(u;w) 2 RB  RS j there exists p 2 P such that(u;w) = (u(p); w(p))g; (10)
that is, the set of competitive equilibrium payo¤s of market M can be described without
explicitly referring to any particular optimal assignment because, for all A 2 F , ui(p;A) =
ui(p) for all i 2 B and wk(p;A) = wk(p) for all k 2 S.
4 Cooperative Solutions
In the next two subsections we study two alternative cooperative solutions for market M:
They di¤er on how a coalition (a subset) of agents can block a proposal of how to distribute
among all agents the total gain from trade obtained at any optimal assignment. The Core
assumes that members of a blocking coalition can only form partnerships among themselves
and have to break all former partnerships with non-members. Set-wise stability allows
members of a blocking coalition to keep or reduce their former exchanges with members
outside the blocking coalition. Thus, Set-wise blocking is easier than Core-wise blocking.
It seems to us that Set-wise stability is also a more reasonable solution for this class of
markets. Our results will indicate from two points of view that Set-wise stability is closer
to the set of competitive equilibrium payo¤s than the Core is: (i) (set inclusion) closer and
(ii) the set of Set-wise stable payo¤s and the set of competitive equilibrium payo¤s already
coincide in a two-fold replicated market.
4.1 Set-wise Stability
The notion of Core blocking requires that all members of the blocking coalition have to give
up all previous exchange agreements with non-members. However this may be too drastic
because, in some circumstances, it is reasonable to let members of the blocking coalition
to keep some (or all) previous exchanges with members outside the blocking coalition.
This stronger notion of blocking gives rise to the notion of Set-wise stability.3 Let M =
3Sotomayor (1999b) denes and studies this concept for a generalization of Shapley and Shubik (1972)s
assignment game. See also Sotomayor (2007, 2009, and 2011) for an analysis of Set-wise stability in her
time-sharing assignment games. Klaus and Walzl (2009) have studied Strong and Set-wise stability for an
ordinal many-to-many matchings model with contracts under di¤erent preference restrictions. Our notion
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(B;G;S; V; d; R;Q) be a market and let C  B [ S be a coalition. Denote the subsets of
buyers and sellers in C by BC = C \ B and SC = C \ S, respectively.
Denition 3 Let M = (B;G;S; V; d; R;Q) be a market and C be a coalition. A feasible
assignment bA for marketM is SW compatible with C if there exists an optimal assignment
A 2 F such that:
(i) For every i 2 BC; bAijk > 0 implies that either k 2 SC or else bAijk  Aijk:
(ii) For every k 2 SC; bAijk > 0 implies that either i 2 BC or else bAijk  Aijk:
(iii) For every i =2 BC and k =2 SC; bAijk = 0 for every j 2 G.
We want to emphasize that the denition of SW compatibility allows to reallocate in
any way the amount of the goods exchanged between a buyer and a seller if they both
belong to the coalition but only to keep or decrease their exchanges if one is a member of
the coalition and the other is not.
LetM = (B;G;S; V; d; R;Q) be a market. A three-dimensional matrix   = ( ijk)(i;j;k)2BGS
is a distribution matrix if for all (i; j; k) 2 B  G  S such that vij  rjk, it holds
that vij   ijk  rjk. Let   be a distribution matrix and assume vij  rjk for some
(i; j; k) 2 B  G  S. Then,  ijk describes a way of how buyer i and seller k could split
the gain vij   rjk that they would obtain from trading one unit of good j: buyer i receives
vij    ijk and seller k receives  ijk   rjk. If vij < rjk then the value  ijk will be irrelevant
because i and k do not trade good j at any optimal assignment. Observe that a distribution
matrix is not necessarily anonymous because a buyer can obtain di¤erent per unit gains
from buying good j from two di¤erent sellers, and vice versa.
Denition 4 A payo¤ (u;w) 2 RB  RS for market M = (B;G;S; V; d; R;Q) is not
SW blocked if there exists a distribution matrix   = ( ijk)(i;j;k)2BGS such that for every
coalition C  B[S and every feasible assignment bA that is SW compatible with C, we have
of Set-wise stability as well as Klaus and Walzl (2009)s stability notions are natural extensions of the
concept rst dened by Sotomayor (1999b). The main di¤erence between our notion and Klaus and Walzl
(2009)s notions is that ours applies to a transferable utility setting while theirs apply to an ordinal setting.
This is important when checking the protability of a deviating coalition; for the transferable utility setting
utilities of all members in the coalition are added while in the ordinal setting all members of the blocking
coalition have to receive (in ordinal terms) a better (for Strong stability) and individually rational (for
Set-wise stability) set of contracts.
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that P
i2BC
ui +
P
k2SC
wk 
P
(i;j;k)2BCGSC
 ijk  bAijk + P
(i;j;k)2BCG(SC)c
(vij    ijk)  bAijk
+
P
(i;j;k)2(BC)cGSC
( ijk   rjk)  bAijk:
 M(C; bA; ):4
A payo¤ (u;w) 2 RB  RS is not SW blocked if there is a set of exchanges between
buyers and sellers (the optimal assignment A in Denition 3) and a set of agreements
on how to share the per unit gains from trade (the distribution matrix  ) such that no
coalition of agents, independently of the agreements they have with non-members, can
jointly obtain a strictly higher payo¤ by reassigning their exchanges among themselves
and by keeping or reducing their exchanges with non-members. Observe that by letting
C = B[S,Pi2B ui+Pk2S wk = TM : That is, agents can optimally achieve (u;w) in a way
that is immune to deviating coalitions. Finally, a payo¤ vector is Set-wise stable if it can
not be SW blocked.
Denition 5 A payo¤ (u;w) 2 RB  RS for market M = (B;G;S; V; d; R;Q) is Set-wise
stable if it is not SW blocked.
Denote by SW the set of Set-wise stable payo¤s of market M = (B;G;S; V; d; R;Q).
When we want to emphasize marketM we write SWM : The set of competitive equilibrium
payo¤s is contained in the set of Set-wise stable payo¤s.
Proposition 1 Let p 2 P be a competitive equilibrium price of market M = (B;G;S; V; d; R;Q).
Then, (u(p); w(p)) 2 SW.
Proof See the Appendix. 
The idea of the proof is as follows. Assume p 2 P and (u(p); w(p)) =2 SW. This means
that every distribution matrix   has a SW block. In particular, we consider one of the
SW blocks of the anonymous distribution matrix p (i.e., for all j 2 G; pj =  ijk =  i0jk0
for all i; i0; k and k0). Hence, there exist a coalition C and a feasible assignment bA,
4Given a set X we denote its complementary set by Xc: The reader should not be confused with
this notation when the set X is either BC or SC ; whose complements are denoted by  BCc and  SCc ;
respectively.
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SW compatible with C, such that C can obtain a strictly larger payo¤. The key step of
the proof is to construct from bA a reduced market M by keeping xed and excluding from
M the exchanges specied by bA between a member of C and a non member of C: Namely,
the maximal demand di of every buyer i in the blocking coalition is reduced by the number
of units that i buys to sellers outside the coalition. The maximal capacity qjk of each good
j owned by every seller k in the blocking coalition is reduced by the number of units of
good j that k sells to buyers outside the coalition. Then, although tedious, it only remains
to be shown that the Strong Duality theorem of Linear Programming is violated (see the
Appendix at the end of the paper), a contradiction.5
Remark 1 and Proposition 1 above say that
? 6= CE  SW : (11)
Example 1 below shows that the inclusion in (11) may be strict because there exist markets
with a payo¤ (u;w) 2 SWnCE :
Example 1 Let M = (B;S;G; V; d; R;Q) be a market where B = fb1 ; b2g, G = fg1; g2g,
S = fs1g (i.e., B = G = 2 and S = 1), V =
 
8 4
8 1
!
, d = (2; 3), R = (4; 2), and
Q = (4; 1). The unique optimal assignment of market M is A =
 
1 1
3 0
!
and
TM(A) = (v11   r11)  A111 + (v12   r21)  A121 + (v21   r11)  A211 + (v22   r21)  A221
= (8  4)  1 + (4  2)  1 + (8  4)  3 + (1  2)  0
= 18:
It is easy to see that the set of competitive equilibrium prices of marketM is P = f(p1; p2) 2
R2+ j 2  p2  4 and p1 = p2 + 4g: For every p 2 P, the per-unit gains are
1(p) = 8  p1 = 4  p2;
2(p) = 8  p1;
11(p) = p1   4; and
21(p) = p2   2:
5Or equivalently, we reach the conclusion that coalition C in market M Core blocks (u(p); w(p)), a
contradiction since, as we will see in the next subsection, competitive equilibrium payo¤s can not be
Core blocked.
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Moreover u1(p) = 2  1(p) = 16  2p1; u2(p) = 3  2(p) = 24  3p1 and w1(p) = 4  11(p) +
1  21(p) = 5  p1   22: The set of competitive equilibrium payo¤s is
CE = f(u1; u2; w1) 2 R3+ j u1 = 16  2p1; u2 = 24  3p1; w1 = 5p1   22 and 6  p1  8g:
Consider the vector (u1; u2; w1) = (113 ; 5;
28
3
). It is immediate to see that (11
3
; 5; 28
3
) =2 CE
because u1 = 113 implies p1 =
37
3
and u2 = 5 implies p1 = 19=3. To see that (113 ; 5;
28
3
) 2 SW
consider   =
 
 111  121
 211  221
!
=
 
19
3
2
19
3
2
!
, C = fb1; s1g (it is immediate to see that the
other coalitions can not SW block (11
3
; 5; 28
3
)), and bA =  2 0
2 0
!
: Observe that bA is
SW compatible with C: Then,
13 >  111 bA111 + ( 211   r11) bA211 = 4  2 + (19
3
  4)  2 = 38
3
and for any other di¤erent assignment A0 that is SW compatible with C;
13 >  111A
0
111 + ( 211   r11)A0211:
Hence, (11
3
; 5; 28
3
) 2 SWnCE : 
Competitive equilibrium presupposes that agents are price-takers. This assumption
makes sense only when the number of agents is large and individual quantity decisions are
insignicant. Thus, and at the light of ? 6= CE ( SW, it is natural to ask whether the set
of Set-wise stable payo¤s and the set of competitive equilibrium payo¤s are approximately
the same when the number of agents becomes large. To enlarge the market, we follow a
procedure with a long tradition in Economics which consists of replicating the market.6
Given a market M = (B;G;S; V; d; R;Q) and a strictly positive integer  we will consider
the  fold replicated market M to be composed of  agents of each type. For two buyers
6It started by Edgeworth (1881) and pursued by Debreu and Scarf (1963) for classical economies with
production and by Owen (1975) for linear production games, among others. A linear production game
consists of a set of players, each with an endowment (non necessarily integer valued) of m goods that can
only be used to produce in a linear way units of p di¤erent goods for which there are competitive markets.
Owen (1975) shows that the sequence of Cores of replicated linear production games converges to the set
of competitive equilibrium payo¤s. Moreover, Owen (1975) also shows that if the competitive equilibrium
price is unique then the Core of a large but nitely replicated game coincides with the (unique) competitive
equilibrium payo¤. See also Kaneko and Wooders (1982) and Wooders (1983, 1994 and 2010) for Core
convergence results for games (with and without side payments) and markets.
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i 2 B and i0 2 B0 (in replicas  and 0, respectively) to be of the same type we require
them to have the same valuations of all goods (i.e., vij = vi0j = vij for all j 2 G) and the
same maximal demands (i.e., di = di0 = di). For two sellers k 2 S and k0 2 S0 (in
replicas  and 0, respectively) to be of the same type we require them to have the same
reservation prices of all goods (i.e., rjk = rjk0 = rjk for all j 2 G) and the same amounts
of all goods (i.e., qjk = qjk0 = qjk for all j 2 G).
Our main result of the paper states that the Set-wise stable set of the 2 fold replicated
market has the equal treatment property (all replicated agents receive the same payo¤)
and coincides with the set of competitive equilibrium payo¤s.
Theorem 1 Let (u;w); (u; w) 2 RB+RS+ be two payo¤ vectors of market M = (B;G;S; V; d; R;Q):
Then,
((u;w); (u; w)) 2 SW2M if and only if (u;w) = (u; w) 2 CE :
Proof See the Appendix. 
The idea of the proof is as follows. Fix a market M = (B;G;S; V; d; R;Q): First,
by Lemma 2 in the Appendix, we show that for any replica a Set-wise stable payo¤ has
the equal treatment property: all agents of the same type receive the same payo¤ (this
is a classical property that also holds for the Core of replicated markets). Second, by
denition, a Set-wise stable payo¤ (u;w) can be obtained by a set of trade agreements that
are SW unblocked; that is, there exists a distribution matrix   such that no coalition C
can SW block (u;w) becauseP
i2BC
ui +
P
k2SC
wk  M(C; bA; ); (12)
where bA is SW compatible with C. Third, and as a consequence of Lemma 4 in the
Appendix, we show that one of the unblocked set of trade agreements (described by a
distribution matrix  ) is anonymous because there exists p = (pj)j2G such that for all
j 2 G, pj =  ijk for all (i; k) 2 BS and   can be replaced by p in condition (12); namely,P
i2BC
ui +
P
k2SC
wk  M(C; bA; p): (13)
Fourth, for any payo¤ vector (u;w) in market M with the property that the payo¤ vector
((u;w); (u;w)) is a Set-wise stable payo¤ of the two replica market 2M; the vector p that
satises condition (13) is a competitive equilibrium price of market M: Finally, in Lemma
6 in the Appendix, we show that if a payo¤ vector (u;w) satises condition (13) for a
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competitive equilibrium price vector p then (u;w) is a competitive equilibrium payo¤ of
market M .
We use Example 1 again to illustrate how a payo¤ (u;w) 2 SWnCE can be already
SW blocked in the two replicated market.
Example 1 (continued) We have already showed that (u1; u2; w1) = (113 ; 5;
28
3
) 2 SWnCE .
Hence, by Theorem 1, ((11
3
; 5; 28
3
); (11
3
; 5; 28
3
)) =2 SW2M . To illustrate how it is SW blocked,
consider any distribution matrix such that  21111 = 7:5, the coalition C = fb11 ; b12 ; s11g, and
the assignment
bA =
0BBB@
bA11111 bA11211 bA11112 bA11212bA21111 bA21211 bA21212 bA21212bA12111 bA12111 bA12112 bA12112bA22111 bA22111 bA22112 bA22112
1CCCA =
0BBB@
1 1 0 0
1 0 0 0
2 0 0 0
0 0 3 0
1CCCA
SW compatible with C: Then,
2M(C; bA; ) =  11111  bA11111 +  11211  bA11211 +  12111  bA12111 + ( 21111   r111)  bA21111
= 4  1 + 2  1 + 4  2 + (7:5  4)  1
= 17:5
>
50
3
= u11 + u12 + w11 :
Hence, C SW blocks ((11
3
; 5; 28
3
); (11
3
; 5; 28
3
)): Observe that the expression ( 21111   r111) bA21111 = (7:5   4)  1 shows that one member of the blocking coalition (seller 11) keeps
selling 1 unit of good 1 to buyer 21, who is not a member of the blocking coalition C. 
4.2 Core
Let M = (B;G;S; V; d; R;Q) be a market and let C  B [ S be a coalition. Remember
that we denote the subsets of buyers and sellers in C by BC = C \ B and SC = C \ S,
respectively. The submarket MC is the (natural) restriction of market M to coalition C;
namely, MC is the market (BC;GC;SC; V C; dC; RC; QC), where GC = fj 2 G jthere exists
k 2 SC such that qjk > 0g, V C = (vij)(ij)2BCGC , dC = (di)i2BC , RC = (rjk)(j;k)2GCSC , and
QC = (qjk)(j;k)2GCSC :
Denition 6 A feasible assignment A is Core compatible with coalition C if Aijk 6= 0
implies fi; kg  C:
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That is, a feasible assignment A is Core compatible with C if all members of C interact
only among themselves. Let A be an assignment Core compatible with coalition C and
denote by AC the feasible assignment for submarket MC, where AC = (Aijk)(i;j;k)2BCGCSC :
When the reference coalition is clear from the context we often omit the superscript C.
Denote by FC the set of optimal assignments of market MC; i.e.,
FC = fAC 2 ZBGS+ j TM
C
(AC)  TMC(AC) for any feasible assignment ACg:
Fix a marketM = (B;G;S; V; d; R;Q): To dene a cooperative game v with transferable
utility associated to M , let C  B [ S be a coalition and set
v(C) = TMC(AC);
where AC is any optimal assignment of submarket MC. Namely, v(C) is the maximal
total utility that members of C can guarantee by exchanging their resources only among
themselves. Obviously, v(C) = 0 for all C such that either BC = ? or SC = ?, and hence,
v(?) = 0. Moreover, v(fig) = 0 for all i 2 B and v(fkg) = 0 for all k 2 S.
A pair (u;w) 2 RB  RS is a (feasible) payo¤ of market M = (B;G;S; V; d; R;Q) ifP
i2B
ui +
P
k2S
wk = v(B [ S):
A payo¤ of market M is a distribution among agents of the total gains from trade at any
optimal assignment of market M .
Denition 7 A payo¤ (u;w) 2 RBRS of marketM = (B;G;S; V; d; R;Q) is Core blocked
by coalition C  B [ S if P
i2BC
ui +
P
k2SC
wk < v(C):
Denition 8 A payo¤ (u;w) 2 RBRS of market M = (B;G;S; V; d; R;Q) belongs to the
Core if there does not exist a coalition C  B [ S such that (u;w) is Core blocked by C.
Let Co be the set of payo¤s belonging to the Core of market M = (B;G;S; V; d; R;Q).
When we want to emphasize marketM we write CoM . To establish the relationship between
the Core and the set of Set-wise stable payo¤s, let (u;w) 2 RB RS be a payo¤ of market
M and assume that coalition C Core blocks (u;w). Let AC 2 FC be arbitrary. Then,P
i2BC
ui +
P
k2SC
wk < v(C) = TMC(AC):
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Let bA be the feasible assignment where, for all (i; j; k) 2 B  G  S,
bAijk = ( ACijk if (i; k) 2 BC  SC
0 otherwise.
Then, bA is a feasible assignment SW compatible with C and for any distribution matrix
 , P
i2BC
ui +
P
k2SC
wk < 
M(C; bA; ) = TMC(AC):
Hence, coalition C SW blocks (u;w): Thus, the Set-wise stable set is a subset of the
Core. For further reference, we state this fact below as Remark 3.
Remark 3 For any market the Set-wise stable set is a subset of the Core.
Thus, we have already showed that the statement of the following corollary holds.7
Corollary 1 For every market M , ? 6= CE  SW  Co. Moreover, the two inclusions
may be strict.
In Example 1 above we have already showed that the rst inclusion may be strict. To
show that the second inclusion may also be strict we return again to Example 1.
Example 1 (continued) Consider the vector (u1; u2; w1) = (4:5; 10; 3:5). To see that
it belongs to the Core of M it is enough to check that for any coalition that can obtain
strictly positive gains from trade can not Core-blocked it. Indeed,
v(fb1; b2; s1g) = 18 = 4:5 + 10 + 3:5 = u1 + u2 + w1:
v(fb1; s1g) = 8 = 4:5 + 3:5 = u1 + w1:
v(fb2; s1g) = 12 < 10 + 3:5 = 13:5 = u2 + w1:
Hence, (4:5; 10; 3:5) 2 Co. Now, to see that (4:5; 10; 3:5) =2 SW consider any distribution
matrix   =
 
 111  121
 211  221
!
. By denition, 8 = v21   211  r11 = 4: Assume rst that
 211 = 4: Then, the optimal assignment A =
 
1 1
3 0
!
is itself SW compatible with
C = fb2g and u2 = 10 < (v21  211) A211+(v22  221) A221 = 4  3+ (v22  221)  0 = 12:
Hence, C = fb2g SW blocks (4:5; 10; 3:5): Assume now that  211 > 4: Then, consider
the assignment bA =  2 0
2 0
!
which is SW compatible with C = fb1; s1g and note that
7The same inclusion relationships hold in the time-sharing assignment games considered by Sotomayor
(2009 and 2011).
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u1+w1 = 8 <  111  bA111+( 211 r11)  bA211 = 4 2+( 211 4) 2; where the inequality follows
from  211 > 4: Hence, C = fb1; s1g SW blocks (4:5; 10; 3:5). Thus (4:5; 10; 3:5) =2 SW.
We want to emphasize again, at the light of the example, that the notions of Set-wise
stability is more natural than Core. When seller 1, as member of the coalition fb1; s1g
Core-blocks (4:5; 10; 3:5) has to stop selling 3 units of good one to b2; while when fb1; s1g
SW blocks (4:5; 10; 3:5), s1 can keep selling 2 units of good one to b2: 
Our second limit result states that, for every market M = (B;G;S; V; d; R;Q), the
sequence of Cores of the M markets converges, when  ! 1, to the set of competitive
equilibrium payo¤s of the replicated market. To state it we need the following lemma saying
that the classical result stating that any payo¤ vector in the Core of a replicated market
assigns the same payo¤ to all agents of the same type also holds in this setting.8
Lemma 1 Let M = (B;G;S; V; d; R;Q) be a market and let   2: Then,
CoM  f(u; w)  ((u;w); :::; (u;w)| {z }
 times
) 2 (RB1  RS1) ::: (RB  RS) j (u;w) 2 CoMg:
Proof See the Appendix.
With some abuse of the language we will say that a payo¤ vector (u;w) 2 RB  RS is
in the Core of the  replicated market if (u; w) 2 CoM .
Theorem 2 Let (u;w) 2 RBRS be a payo¤ of market M = (B;G;S; V; d; R;Q). Then,
(u;w) is in the Core of the  fold replicated market for all   1 if and only if (u;w) is a
competitive equilibrium payo¤ of market M .
Lemma 1 says that for any replica  the payo¤ vectors in the Core of market M have
the equal treatment property. Theorem 2 says that the payo¤ vector that belongs to the
Core of all replicated markets are those obtained by replicating competitive equilibrium
payo¤s of the original market. With an abuse of notation, Theorem 2 says that for any
market M;
1T
=1
CoM = CEM : Moreover, the convergence is monotonically decreasing: if
(u; w) 2 CoM then (u+1; w+1) 2 Co(+1)M ; since any coalition blocking (u; w) should
also block (u+1; w+1):
Theorem 2 can be proved by adapting Owen (1975)s proof of the convergence of the Core
to the set of competitive equilibrium payo¤s for linear programming games, and therefore
8See Debreu and Scarf (1963) and Owen (1975) for this equal treatment result in classical economies
with production and in linear production games, respectively.
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we omit it.9
To illustrate the two di¤erent blocking notions we return to Example 1.
Example 1 (continued) We have already showed that (u1; u2; w1) = (113 ; 5;
28
3
) 2 SWnCE .
Hence, by Theorem 1, ((11
3
; 5; 28
3
); (11
3
; 5; 28
3
)) =2 SW2M . We have already illustrated that
coalition C = fb11 ; b12 ; s11g SW blocks it for a particular distribution matrix  : To illus-
trate now the notion of Core in a two-fold replicated market, consider again the coalition
C = fb11 ; b12 ; s11g that SW blocks ((113 ; 5; 283 ); (113 ; 5; 283 )) =2 SW2M , and whose value is
v(C) = 16. Since, u11+u12+w11 = 503 ; C does not Core-blocks ((113 ; 5; 283 ); (113 ; 5; 283 )): By The-
orem 1, and since (11
3
; 5; 28
3
) =2 CE we already know that for any distribution matrix one can
nd a coalition and a SW compatible assignment that SW blocks ((11
3
; 5; 28
3
); (11
3
; 5; 28
3
)):
The fact that this is not an easy task illustrates the power of Theorem 1 because to show
that (11
3
; 5; 28
3
) =2 CE was very easy. 
Theorem 3 shows that a result similar to Theorem 1 does not hold for the Core. For
each number  of replicas there exists a marketM = (B;G;S; V; d; R;Q) for which the Core
of the  fold replicated market contains a payo¤ that is not a competitive equilibrium
payo¤.
Theorem 3 Let  2 Z+nf0g. Then, there exist a market M = (B;G;S; V; d; R;Q) and a
payo¤ vector (u;w) =2 CE such that (u; w) 2 CoM .
Proof See the Appendix. 
5 Concluding Remarks
The convergence of the Core to competitive equilibria is a pervasive phenomenon that holds
in many settings. Our Theorem 2 is a new result in this line. The convergence in most
of these results is only asymptotic. Owen (1975) is one of the few exceptions where the
convergence is nite. Our main contribution, Theorem 1, is that for generalized assignment
games the convergence of Set-wise stable payo¤s to competitive equilibria only requires
two replica. Since Set-wise stability is a more appropriated notion in this context, our
result suggests that all outcomes that are robust to coalitional deviations in the sense of
Set-wise stability can be obtained as competitive equilibrium outcomes, even in markets
with an small number of agents. Therefore, in relatively small markets with indivisibilities
9The interested reader can nd a detailed proof of Theorem 2 in the authorswebsites.
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similar to generalized assignment games (for instance, markets for intermediate goods),
competitive outcomes are those that are immune to secession by subsets of agents, since
they will coincide with the of Set-wise stable outcomes. We think that this result may be
important for future research studying markets (or general allocation problems) in which
agents may simultaneously be interacting with other agents in di¤erent ways and hence,
the convergence of the Set-wise stable set would be the relevant one to evaluate how robust
is the principle that competitive equilibrium outcomes coincide with the set of outcomes
that are immune to coalitional deviations.
We leave for future research two open problems. First, the analysis of agentsstrategic
behavior in small markets when agents recognize their market power and consequently they
may not take prices as given. Second, the analysis of an intermediate cooperative notion,10
in which a member of a blocking coalition can either keep all agreements with a non-member
or break all of them; this set would be a subset of the Core and contain the Set-wise stable
set, but we do not know whether its convergence to competitive equilibria would be like
the Core (innite) or like Set-wise stability (nite).
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Appendix: Preliminaries and Omitted Proofs
We start with some preliminaries. Let M = (B;G;S; V; d; R;Q) be a market and C be a
coalition. Consider the primal linear problem to which any optimal assignment AC 2 FC is
a solution.
(PLP)C: max
(Aijk)(i;j;k)2BCGCSC2R#B
C#GC#SC
P
(i;j;k)2BCGCSC
 ijk  Aijk
s. t. (P.1)
P
(j;k)2GCSC
Aijk  di for all i 2 BC;
(P.2)
P
i2BC
Aijk  qjk for all (j; k) 2 GC  SC;
(P.3) Aijk  0 for all (i; j; k) 2 BC  GC  SC:
The dual linear problem associated to (PLP)C is the following.
(DLP)C: min
(C ;C)2R#BCR#GC#SC
P
i2BC di  Ci +
P
(j;k)2GCSC qjk  Cjk
s. t. (D.1) Ci + 
C
jk   ijk for all (i; j; k) 2 BC  GC  SC;
(D.2) Ci  0 for all i 2 BC;
(D.3) Cjk  0 for all (j; k) 2 GC  SC:
Let DC be the set of all solutions of the (DLP)C: It is well-known that DC is non-empty.
We will denote the set DB[S by D and (B[S ; B[S) by (; ) 2 D. Then, it is immediate
to check that the following implication holds.
If (; ) 2 D then ((i)i2BC ; (jk)(j;k)2GCSC) 2 DC: (A.1)
Let M = (B;G;S; V; d; R;Q) be a market and (; ) be a vector satisfying (D.1), (D.2),
and (D.3) for C = B[S. We write TDM(; ) to denote the value of the objective function
of the (DLP)B[S at (; ); that is,
TDM (; ) =
P
i di  i +
P
jk qjk  jk:
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The Strong Duality Theorem (SDT) of Linear Programming applied to our setting says the
following (see Dantzig, 1963).
Strong Duality Theorem Let M = (B;G;S; V; d; R;Q) be a market and assume A is
a feasible assignment and (; ) satises (D.1), (D.2), and (D.3) for C = B [ S. Then,
A 2 F and (; ) 2 D if and only if TM(A) = TDM(; ): (A.2)
Proposition 1 Let p 2 P be a competitive equilibrium price vector of market M =
(B;G;S; V; d; R;Q). Then, (u(p); w(p)) 2 SW.
Proof Let p 2 P and assume (u(p); w(p)) =2 SW. Then, for every distribution matrix
  = ( ijk)(i;j;k)2BGS there exists a coalition C  B [ S that SW blocks it. Hence, there
exists a feasible assignment bA that is SW compatible with C such thatP
i2BC
ui(p) +
P
k2SC
wk(p) < 
M(C; bA; ):
In particular, consider the distribution matrix   = ( ijk)(i;j;k)2BGS where for each (i; j; k) 2
BGS,  ijk = pj. Then, there must exist a feasible assignment bA that is SW compatible
with C such that11 P
i2BC
ui(p) +
P
k2SC
wk(p) < 
M(C; bA; p): (A.3)
Now, dene the feasible assignment A as follows: for each (i; j; k) 2 B  G  S,
Aijk =
(
0 if either fi; kg  C or fi; kg  CcbAijk otherwise,
where Cc is the complementary set of C. Dene a new market M =  B;S;G; V; d; R;Q ;
where the new vector of maximal demands d is dened by setting
di = di  
P
(j;k)2GS
Aijk
for all i 2 B, and the new matrix of capacities Q is dened by setting
qjk = qjk  
P
i2B
Aijk
for all (j; k) 2 G  S. Note that if i 2 C then, di = di  
P
(j;k)2G(SC)c bAijk and if k 2 C
then, qjk = qjk  
P
i2(BC)c bAijk for all j 2 G:
11M (C; bA; p) is obtained from M (C; bA; ) by replacing  ijk by pj for all (i; j; k) 2 B G S:
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By (9), P
i2BC
ui(p) +
P
k2SC
wk(p) =
P
i2BC
di  i(p) +
P
(j;k)2GSC
qjk  jk(p);
and note that P
i2BC
di  i(p) =
P
i2BC
di  i(p) +
P
i2BC
(
P
(j;k)2GS
Aijk)  i(p)
=
P
i2BC
di  i(p) +
P
i2BC
(
P
j2G
P
k2(SC)c
bAijk)  i(p)
and for each j 2 G,P
k2SC
qjk  jk(p) =
P
k2SC
qjk  jk(p) +
P
k2SC
(
P
i2B
Aijk)  jk(p)
=
P
k2SC
qjk  jk(p) +
P
k2SC
(
P
i2(BC)c
bAijk)  jk(p):
Hence,
P
i2BC
ui(p) +
P
k2SC
wk(p) =
P
i2BC
di  i(p) +
P
i2BC
(
P
j2G
P
k2(SC)c
bAijk)  i(p)
+
P
k2SC
P
j2G
qjk  jk(p) +
P
k2SC
P
j2G
(
P
i2(BC)c
bAijk)  jk(p): (A.4)
By (7), for every i 2 B and j 2 G,
i(p)  vij   pj: (A.5)
Moreover, by (8), for every (j; k) 2 G  S;
jk(p)  pj   rjk: (A.6)
By (A.3) and (A.4)
P
(i;j;k)2BCGSC
 ijk  bAijk + P
(i;j;k)2BCG(SC)c
(vij   pj)  bAijk+P
(i;j;k)2(BC)cGSC
(pj   rjk)  bAijk > P
i2BC
di  i(p) +
P
i2BC
(
P
j2G
P
k2(SC)c
bAijk)  i(p)
+
P
k2SC
P
j2G
qjk  jk(p) +
P
k2SC
P
j2G
(
P
i2(BC)c
bAijk)  jk(p): (A.7)
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By (A.5), P
i2BC
(
P
j2G
P
k2(SC)c
bAijk)  i(p)  P
(i;j;k)2BCG(SC)c
(vij   pj)  bAijk:
Hence, by (A.7),P
(i;j;k)2BCGSC
 ijk  bAijk + P
(i;j;k)2(BC)cGSC
(pj   rjk)  bAijk >P
i2BC
di  i(p) +
P
k2SC
P
j2G
qjk  jk(p)
+
P
k2SC
P
j2G
(
P
i2(BC)c
bAijk)  jk(p): (A.8)
By (A.6), P
k2SC
P
j2G
(
P
i2(BC)c
bAijk)  jk(p)  P
(i;j;k)2(BC)cGSC
(pj   rjk)  bAijk:
Hence, by (A.8), P
(i;j;k)2BCGSC
 ijk  bAijk > P
i2BC
di  i(p) +
P
k2SC
P
j2G
qjk  jk(p): (A.9)
Observe that since bA is a feasible assignment,
vM(C)  P
(i;j;k)2BCGSC
 ijk  bAijk;
where vM(C) = TM(AC) for any optimal assignmentAC of marketM . Since ((p); (p)) 2 D
then by (A.1), (C(p); C(p)) 2 DC for market M . Hence, by the Strong Duality Theorem,P
i2BC
di  i(p) +
P
k2SC
P
j2G
qjk  jk(p) = vM(C);
contradicting (A.9). 
Lemmas 1 to 6 below will be used to prove Theorem 1.
Lemma 1 Let M = (B;G;S; V; d; R;Q) be a market and let   2: Then
CoM  f(u; w)  ((u;w); :::; (u;w)| {z }
 times
) 2 (RB1  RS1) ::: (RB  RS) j (u;w) 2 CoMg:
Proof Let ((bui1 ; :::; bui)i2B; ( bwk1 ; :::; bwk)k2S) 2 CoM : For every  = 1; :::; ,X
i2B
bui + X
k2S
bwk  v(B [ S)
26
must hold; otherwise, any coalition C = B [ S would Core block (bu; bw). Since for every
 = 1; :::; ; v(B [ S) = v(B [ S);X
i2B
bui + X
k2S
bwk  v(B [ S) (A.10)
must hold for every  = 1; :::; : Let A be an optimal assignment for market M: Dene the
assignment A for market M as follows. For any (i; j; k) 2 (B1[ :::[B);G;S1[ :::[S)
set
Aijk =
(
Aijk if  = 
0 otherwise.
Then, it is easy to show that A is an optimal assignment for market M and T M(A) =
TM(A): Since, by its denition, v(B [ S) = TM(A); (A.10) implies
P
=1
 P
i2B
bui + P
k2S
bwk  v(B [ S) = TM(A) = T M(A):
Hence, since A is an optimal assignment for market M;
P
=1
 P
i2B
bui + P
k2S
bwk = T M(A):
Thus,
P
=1
 P
i2B
bui + P
k2S
bwk = v(B [ S):
By (A.10), P
i2B
bui + P
k2S
bwk = v(B [ S)
must hold for every  = 1; :::; : Assume that there exists a buyer type {^ 2 B and two
replicas  and 0 such that bu{^ > bu{^0 :
Then, the coalition C = [(B [ S)nf{^g] [ f{^0g Core blocks (bu; bw) because
v(C) = v(B [ S) > P
i2Bnf{^g
bui + bu{^0 + P
k2S
bwk :
Similarly for any seller type bk 2 S. Thus, ((bui1 ; :::; bui)i2B; ( bwk1 ; :::; bwk)k2S) = (u; w) for
some payo¤ vector (u;w) 2 RB RS of market M . To obtain a contradiction, assume that
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(u;w) =2 CoM . Then, there exists a coalition C that Core blocks (u;w): But then, C also
Core blocks (bu; bw), a contradiction with (bu; bw) 2 CoM . 
Lemma 2 Let M = (B;G;S; V; d; R;Q) be a market and let   2: Then
SWM  f(u; w)  ((u;w); :::; (u;w)| {z }
 times
) 2 (RB1RS1) ::: (RBRS) j (u;w) 2 SWMg:
Proof Let (bu; bw)  ((bui1 ; :::; bui)i2B; ( bwk1 ; :::; bwk)k2S) 2 SWM : First, observe that for
all  = 1; :::; , ((bui)i2B; ( bwk)k2S) 2 SWM : By Remark 3, ((bui)i2B; ( bwk)k2S) 2 CoM : By
Lemma 1, for all ; 0 = 1; :::; ; bui = bui0 for all i 2 B and bwk = bwk0 for all k 2 S: 
Lemma 3 Let M = (B;G;S; V; d; R;Q) be a market and let (u;w) 2 SW. Then, there
exists a distribution matrix   = ( ijk)(i;j;k)2BGS such that for any optimal assignment A,
and for every i 2 B and k 2 S;
ui =
P
(j;k)2GS
(vij    ijk)  Aijk
and
wk =
P
(i;j)2BG
( ijk   rjk)  Aijk:
Proof Assume (u;w) 2 SW. By the denition of set-wise stability, there exists a distri-
bution matrix   = ( ijk)(i;j;k)2BGS such that for any coalition C  B [S and any feasible
assignment bA that is SW compatible with C, we have thatP
i2BC
ui +
P
k2SC
wi  M(C; bA; ): (A.11)
Let A be any optimal assignment and consider either C = fig or C = fkg. Observe that A
itself is SW compatible with C: Then, by (A.11),
ui 
P
(j;k)2GS
(vij    ijk)  Aijk for every i 2 B
and
wk 
P
(i;j)2BG
( ijk   rjk)  Aijk for every k 2 S:
SinceP
i2B
P
(j;k)2GS
(vij    ijk)Aijk+
P
k2S
P
(i;j)2BG
( ijk   rjk)Aijk =
P
(i;j;k)2BGS
 ijk Aijk = TM(A)
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and
TM(A) =
P
i2B
ui +
P
k2S
wk;
the statement of Lemma 3 follows. 
Lemma 40 Let M = (B;G;S; V; d; R;Q) be a market and let ((u;w); (u;w)) 2 SW2M .
Assume A is an optimal assignment for market M such that Aij0k 6= 0 for some i 2 B,
j0 2 G and k 2 S. Let   = ( ijk)(i;j;k)2(B1[B2)G(S1[S2) be any distribution matrix for
market 2M such that for any coalition C  B1 [ B2 [ S1 [ S2 and any feasible assignmentbA that is SW compatible with C we have thatP
i2C
ui +
P
k2C
wk  2M(C; bA; ): (A.120)
Then,  i1j0k1 =  i2j0k2 :
Proof Assume otherwise; for instance,  i1j0k1 >  i2j0k2 : If  i1j0k1 <  i2j0k2 ; then replace
in the argument that follows the roles of i1 and k1 by i2 and k2, respectively. Consider
the coalition C = fi1; k2g: From the optimal assignment A of market M we dene the
assignment bA for market 2M by decreasing in 1 unit the exchanges of good j0 between i1
and k1 and between i2 and k2 and by simultaneously increasing in 1 unit of good j0 the
exchange between i1 and k2: Namely, for every (i; j; k) 2 B1 [ B2  G  S1 [ S2, dene
bAijk =
8>>><>>>:
Aijk   1 if i = i1; j = j0 and k = k1
Aijk   1 if i = i2; j = j0 and k = k2
Aijk + 1 if i = i1; j = j0 and k = k2
Aijk otherwise.
Observe that since by assumption Ai1j0k1 = Ai2j0k2 6= 0, bA is a feasible assignment for market
2M . Moreover, bA is SW compatible with C = fi1; k2g. Dene
bui1 = P
(j;k)2G(S1[S2)
(vi1j    i1jk)  bAi1jk = P
(j;k)2G(S1[S2)nfk1;k2g
(vi1j    i1jk)  Ai1jk
+
P
j2Gnfj0g
(vi1j    i1jk1)  Ai1jk1 +
P
j2Gnfj0g
(vi1j    i1jk2)  Ai1jk2
+(vi1j0    i1j0k1)  (Ai1j0k1   1) + (vi1j0    i1j0k2)  (Ai1j0k2 + 1)
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and
bwk2 = P
(i;j)2(B1[B2)G
( ijk2   rjk2)  bAijk2 = P
(i;j)2(B1[B2)nfi1;i2gG
( ijk2   rjk2)  Aijk2
+
P
j2Gnfj0g
( i1jk1   rjk2)  Ai1jk2 +
P
j2Gnfj0g
( i2jk2   rjk2)  Ai2jk2
+( i1j0k2   rj0k2)  (Ai1j0k2 + 1) + ( i2j0k2   rj0k2)  (Ai2j0k2   1) :
On the other hand,
ui1 =
P
(j;k)2G(S1[S2)
(vi1j    i1jk)  Ai1jk =
P
(j;k)2G(S1[S2)nfk1;k2g
(vi1j    i1jk)  Ai1jk
+
P
j2Gnfj0g
(vi1j    i1jk1)  Ai1jk1 +
P
j2Gnfj0g
(vi1j    i1jk2)  Ai1jk2
+(vi1j0    i1j0k1)  Ai1j0k1 + (vi1j0    i1j0k2)  Ai1j0k2
and
wk2 =
P
(i;j)2(B1[B2)G
( ijk2   rjk2)  Aijk2 =
P
(i;j)2(B1[B2)nfi1;i2gG
( ijk2   rjk2)  Aijk2
+
P
j2Gnfj0g
( i1jk2   rjk2)  Ai1jk2 +
P
j2Gnfj0g
( i2jk2   rjk2)  Ai2jk2
+( i1j0k2   rj0k2)  Ai1j0k2 + ( i2j0k2   rj0k2)  Ai2j0k2 :
By denition of bA,
ui1 + wk2   (bui1 + bwk2) = (vi1j0    i1j0k1)  Ai1j0k1 + (vi1j0    i1j0k2)  Ai1j0k2
+( i1j0k2   rj0k2)  Ai1j0k2 + ( i2j0k2   rj0k2)  Ai2j0k2
  (vi1j0    i1j0k1)  (Ai1j0k1   1)  (vi1j0    i1j0k2)  (Ai1j0k2 + 1)
  ( i1j0k2   rj0k2)  (Ai1j0k2 + 1)  ( i2j0k2   rj0k2)  (Ai2j0k2   1) =
= (vi1j0    i1j0k1)  (vi1j0    i1j0k2)
  ( i1j0k2   rj0k2) + ( i2j0k2   rj0k2)
=   i1j0k1 +  i2j0k2 :
Since by assumption  i1j0k1 >  i2j0k2 ; we have that ui1 + wk2 < bui1 + bwk2 ; a contradiction
with (A.12). 
Lemma 4 Let M = (B;G;S; V; d; R;Q) be a market and let ((u;w); (u;w)) 2 SW2M .
Assume A is an optimal assignment for market M such that Aij0k 6= 0 6= Ai0j0k0 for some
i; i0 2 B, j0 2 G and k; k0 2 S; where i and i0, as well as k and k0, may be the same agent.
Let   = ( ijk)(i;j;k)2(B1[B2)G(S1[S2) be any distribution matrix for market 2M such that for
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any coalition C  B1 [B2 [S1 [S2 and any feasible assignment bA that is SW compatible
with C we have that P
i2C
ui +
P
k2C
wk  2M(C; bA; ): (A.12)
Then,  ij0k =  i0j0k0 :
Proof If i = i0 and k = k0 the result follows. Assume otherwise; for instance,  ij0k >
 i0j0k0 : If  ij0k <  i0j0k0 ; then replace in the argument that follows the roles of i and k by i0
and k0, respectively. Consider the coalition C = fi1; k02g: From the optimal assignment A of
marketM we dene the assignment bA for market 2M by decreasing in 1 unit the exchanges
of good j0 between i1 and k1; i01 and k
0
1; and between i
0
2 and k
0
2 and by simultaneously
increasing in 1 unit of good j0 the exchange between i1 and k02: Namely, for every (i; j; k) 2
B1 [ B2  G  S1 [ S2, dene
bAijk =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
Aijk   1
Aijk   1
if i = i1; j = j0 and k = k1
if i = i2; j = j0 and k = k2
Aijk   1 if i = i01; j = j0 and k = k01
Aijk + 1 if i = i1; j = j0 and k = k02
Aijk otherwise.
Observe that since by assumption Aij0k 6= 0 6= Ai0j0k0, then Ai1j0k1 6= 0; Ai2j0k2 6= 0; Ai01j0k01 6=
0 and either i 6= i0 or k 6= k0 (or both) hold, bA is a feasible assignment for market 2M .
Moreover, bA is SW compatible with C = fi1; k02g. Dene
bui1 = P
(j;k)2G(S1[S2)
(vi1j    i1jk)  bAi1jk = P
(j;k)2G(S1[S2)nfk1;k02g
(vi1j    i1jk)  Ai1jk
+
P
j2Gnfj0g
(vi1j    i1jk1)  Ai1jk1 +
P
j2Gnfj0g
 
vi1j    i1jk02
  Ai1jk02
+(vi1j0    i1j0k1)  (Ai1j0k1   1) +
 
vi1j0    i1j0k02
   Ai1j0k02 + 1
and
bwk02 = P
(i;j)2(B1[B2)G
 
 ijk02   rjk02
  bAijk02 = P
(i;j)2(B1[B2)nfi1;i02gG
 
 ijk02   rjk02
  Aijk02
+
P
j2Gnfj0g
 
 i1jk1   rjk02
  Ai1jk02 + P
j2Gnfj0g
 
 i02jk02   rjk02
  Ai02jk02
+
 
 i1j0k02   rj0k02
   Ai1j0k02 + 1+   i02j0k02   rj0k02   Ai02j0k02   1 :
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On the other hand,
ui1 =
P
(j;k)2G(S1[S2)
(vi1j    i1jk)  Ai1jk =
P
(j;k)2G(S1[S2)nfk1;k02g
(vi1j    i1jk)  Ai1jk
+
P
j2Gnfj0g
(vi1j    i1jk1)  Ai1jk1 +
P
j2Gnfj0g
 
vi1j    i1jk02
  Ai1jk02
+(vi1j0    i1j0k1)  Ai1j0k1 +
 
vi1j0    i1j0k02
  Ai1j0k02
and
wk02 =
P
(i;j)2(B1[B2)G
 
 ijk02   rjk02
  Aijk02 = P
(i;j)2(B1[B2)nfi1;i02gG
 
 ijk02   rjk02
  Aijk02
+
P
j2Gnfj0g
 
 i1jk02   rjk02
  Ai1jk02 + P
j2Gnfj0g
 
 i02jk02   rjk02
  Ai02jk02
+
 
 i1j0k02   rj0k02
  Ai1j0k02 +   i02j0k02   rj0k02  Ai02j0k02 :
By denition of bA,
ui1 + wk02   (bui1 + bwk02) = (vi1j0    i1j0k1)  Ai1j0k1 +  vi1j0    i1j0k02  Ai1j0k02
+
 
 i1j0k02   rj0k02
  Ai1j0k02 +   i02j0k02   rj0k02  Ai02j0k02
  (vi1j0    i1j0k1)  (Ai1j0k1   1) 
 
vi1j0    i1j0k02
   Ai1j0k02 + 1
    i1j0k02   rj0k02   Ai1j0k02 + 1    i02j0k02   rj0k02   Ai02j0k02   1 :
= (vi1j0    i1j0k1) 
 
vi1j0    i1j0k02

    i1j0k02   rj0k02+   i02j0k02   rj0k02
=   i1j0k1 +  i02j0k02 :
Since by assumption  ij0k >  i0j0k0 ; by lemma 4, we have that  i1j0k1 >  i02j0k02 ; we have
that ui1 + wk02 < bui1 + bwk02 ; a contradiction with (A.12). 
Lemma 5 Let M = (B;G;S; V; d; R;Q) be a market and let ((u;w); (u;w)) 2 SW2M :
Then, there exists a competitive equilibrium price p = (p1; :::; pG); with pj  minfrjk j k 2 S
such that qjk > 0g for all j 2 G; such that for any coalition C  B [ S and any feasible
assignment bA that is SW compatible with C; we have that:P
i2BC
ui +
P
k2SC
wk  M(C; bA; p):
Proof Assume that ((u;w); (u;w)) 2 SW2M . Then, there exists a distribution matrix
  = ( ijk)(i;j;k)2B1[B2GS1[S2 such that for any a coalition C  B1 [ B2 [ S1 [ S2; and any
feasible assignment bA that is SW compatible with C; we have thatP
i2C
ui +
P
k2C
wk  2M(C; bA; ): (A.13)
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To proceed with the proof we dene a price vector p = (pj)j2G 2 RG+ as follows. Consider
rst any j 2 G for which there exist i 2 B and k 2 S such that Aijk 6= 0 for some optimal
assignment A for market M . Then, dene pj =  ijk: Second, for any j 2 G such that
for all optimal assignments A for market M and all i 2 B and k 2 S, Aijk = 0, dene
pj = minfrjk j k 2 S is such that qjk > 0g: Then, by Lemma 4, p is well-dened. Observe
that for any optimal assignment A of market M; the price vector p = (p1; :::; pG) satises
that for every coalition C  B[S and every feasible assignment bA that is SW compatible
with C we have that: P
i2BC
ui +
P
k2SC
wk  M(C; bA; p): (A.14)
We shall show that (p;A) is a competitive equilibrium of M by showing that the equi-
librium conditions (E.D) and (E.S) are satised.
(E.D) For each buyer i 2 B; A(i) 2 Di (p) :
Since A 2 F ; (D.a) and (D.b) hold.
(D.c): r>i (p) 6= ; =)
P
jk A(i)jk = di:
Assume r>i0 (p) 6= ;; i.e., there exists j0 2 G such that vi0j0 pj0 = maxj2Gfvi0j pjg > 0:
Assume that X
jk
Ai0jk < di0 : (A.15)
Without loss of generality suppose that i0 belongs to the rst replica; i.e., i0 = i1. Consider
rst the case where there are i2 2 B2 and k2 2 S2 with the property that Ai2j0k2 6= 0.
Consider the coalition C = fi1; k2g and its SW compatible assignment bA where, for all
(i; j; k) 2 B  G  S,
bAijk =
8><>:
Aijk + 1 if i = i1; j = j0 and k = k2
Aijk   1 if i = i2; j = j0 and k = k2
Aijk otherwise.
By (A.15) and Ai2j0k2 6= 0, bA is a feasible assignment and SW compatible with coalition
fi1; k2g. Then, dene bui1 and bwk2 as the payo¤s of buyer i1 and seller k2 at assignment bA,
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respectively. Then, by denition of bA,
ui1 + wk2   (bui1 + bwk2) = (vi1j0    i1j0k2)  Ai1j0k2
+( i1j0k2   rj0k2)  Ai1j0k2 + ( i2j0k2   rj0k2)  Ai2j0k2
 (vi1j0    i1j0k2)  bAi1j0k2
 ( i1j0k2   rj0k2)  bAi1j0k2   ( i2j0k2   rj0k2)  bAi2j0k2
=  (vi1j0    i1j0k2)  ( i1j0k2   rj0k2) + ( i2j0k2   rj0k2)
=  vi1j0 +  i2j0k2 :
By Lemma 4,  i2j0k2 = pj0 and Ai2j0k2 6= 0, by (A.14), 0  vi1j0 pj0 ; which is a contradiction
with j0 2 r>i1(p):
Assume now that for all i00 2 B1 [ B2 and all k00 2 S1 [ S2, Ai00j0k00 = 0. By denition,
pj0 = minfrj0k j k is such that qj0k > 0g: Let k 2 S1 [ S2 be such that qj0k > 0.
Consider the coalition C = fi1; kg and its SW compatible assignment bA where, for all
(i; j; k) 2 (B1 [ B2) G  (S1 [ S2)
bAijk = ( Aijk + 1 if i = i1; j = j0 and k = k
Aijk otherwise.
By (A.15) and qj0k > 0, bA is a feasible assignment. Then, as before,
ui1 + wk   (bui1 + bwk) = (vi1j0    i1j0k)  Ai1j0k + ( i1j0k   rj0k)  Ai1j0k
 (vi1j0    i1j0k)  bAi1j0k   ( i1j0k   rj0k)  bAi1j0k
=  (vi1j0    i1j0k)  ( i1j0k   rj0k)
=  vi1j0 + rj0k :
By (A.14), vi1j0  rj0k for every i1; which implies that vi1j0  pj0 contradicting that
j0 2 r>i1(p):
(D.d):
P
k A(i)jk > 0 =) j 2 ri (p):
Assume otherwise; i.e., there exist i0; j0; k0 such that Ai0j0k0 6= 0 and j0 =2 ri0 (p): We
distinguish between the following two cases.
Case 1: vi0j0   pj0 < 0: Consider the coalition C = fi0g and its compatible assignment bA
where bAijk = ( 0 if i = i0; j = j0 and k = k0
Aijk otherwise.
Dene bui0 as the utility of buyer i0 at assignment bA: Then, it is immediate to see that
ui0 < bui0 ; contradicting (A.14).
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Case 2: There exists j00 2 ri0 (p) such that
(vi0j00   pj00) > (vi0j0   pj0)  0: (A.16)
Note that Ai0j0k0 6= 0: Assume rst that there exist i00 2 B1 [ B2 and k00 2 S1 [ S2 such
that Ai00j00k00 6= 0: This imply that (i0; k0) 2 B  S with  2 f1; 2g and (i00; k00) 2 B  S
with  2 f1; 2g: Consider the coalition C = fi0; k00g and its SW compatible assignment bA
where, for all (i; j; k) 2 B  G  S,
bAijk =
8>>><>>>:
Aijk   1 if i = i0; j = j0 and k = k0
Aijk   1 if i = i00; j = j00 and k = k00
Aijk + 1 if i = i0; j = j00 and k = k00
Aijk otherwise.
Then, dene bui0 and bwk00 as the payo¤s of buyer i0 and seller k00 at assignment bA, respectively.
Then, by denition of bA,
ui0 + wk00   (bui0 + bwk00) = (vi0j0    i0j0k0)  Ai0j0k0 + (vi0j00    i0j00k00)  Ai0j00k00
+( i0j00k00   rj00k00)  Ai0j00k00 + ( i00j00k00   rj00k00)  Ai00j00k00
 (vi0j0    i0j0k0)  bAi0j0k0   (vi0j00    i0j00k00)  bAi0j00k00
 ( i0j00k00   rj00k00)  bAi0j00k00   ( i00j00k00   rj00k00)  bAi00j00k00
= (vi0j0    i0j0k0)  (vi0j00    i0j00k00)  ( i0j00k00   rj00k00) + ( i00j00k00   rj00k00)
= vi0j0    i0j0k0   vi0j00 +  i0j00k00    i0j00k00 + rj00k00 +  i00j00k00   rj00k00
= vi0j0    i0j0k0   (vi0j00    i00j00k00):
By Lemma 4  i0j0k0 = pj0 and  i00j00k00 = pj00 ; and by (A.16), ui0 + wk00   (bui0 + bwk00) =
vi0j0 pj0 vi0j00+pj00) < 0, a contradiction with (A.14). Assume now that for all i00 2 B1[B2
and all k00 2 S1 [ S2, Ai00j00k00 = 0: Let k 2 S1 [ S2 be such that qj00k > 0: By (1), such
k does exist. Consider the coalition C = fi0; kg and its SW compatible assignment bA
where, for all (i; j; k) 2 B  G  S,
bAijk =
8><>:
Aijk   1 if i = i0; j = j0 and k = k0
1 if i = i0; j = j00 and k = k
Aijk otherwise.
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Then, proceeding as before, dene bui0 and bwk as the payo¤s of buyer i0 and seller k at
assignment bA, respectively. Then, by denition of bA,
ui0 + wk   (bui0 + bwk) = (vi0j0    i0j0k0)  Ai0j0k0   (vi0j0    i0j0k0)  bAi0j0k0
 (vi0j00    i0j00k)  bAi0j00k   ( i0j00k   rj00k)  bAi0j00k
= (vi0j0    i0j0k0)  (vi0j00    i0j00k)  ( i0j00k   rj00k)
= vi0j0    i0j0k0   (vi0j00   rj00k):
By Lemma 4,  i0j0k0 = pj0 ; by (A.14), vi0j0   pj0  vi0j00   rj00k for every k: Because
pj  mink(rjk); we have that vi0j0   pj0  vi0j00   pj00 ; a contradiction with (A.16).
(E.S) For each good j 2 G and each seller k 2 S; PiAijk 2 Sjk (pj) :
Fix j0 2 G and k0 2 S. Assume rst that pj0 < rj0k0 : We want to show that
P
iAij0k0 =
0: Suppose that Ai0j0k0 6= 0: Consider the coalition C = fk0g and its SW compatible
assignment bA where, for every (i; j; k) 2 B  G  S,
bAijk = ( 0 if i = i0; j = j0 and k = k0
Aijk otherwise.
Dene bwk0 as the utility of seller k0 at assignment bA: Then, it is immediate to see that
wk0 < bwk0 ; contradicting (A.14).
Assume now that pj0 = rj0k0 :We want to show that 0 
P
iAij0k0  qj0k0 : But this holds
because A is a feasible assignment.
Finally, assume that pj0 > rj0k0 : We want to show that
P
iAij0k0 = qj0k0 : AssumeP
iAij0k0 < qj0k0 : Hence,
qj0k0 > 0: (A.17)
Consider rst the case where there exist i0 2 B1[B2 and k00 2 S1[S2 such that Ai0j0k00 6= 0:
This imply that (i0; k00) 2 B  S with  2 f1; 2g: Consider the coalition C = fi0; k0g and
its SW compatible assignment bA where, for all (i; j; k) 2 B  G  S,
bAijk =
8><>:
Aijk   1 if i = i0; j = j0 and k = k00
Aijk + 1 if i = i0; j = j0 and k = k0
Aijk otherwise.
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Then, dene bui0 and bwk0 as the payo¤s of buyer i0 and seller k0 at assignment bA, respectively.
Then, by denition of bA,
ui0 + wk0   (bui0 + bwk0) = (vi0j0    i0j0k00)  Ai0j0k00 + (vi0j0    i0j0k0)  Ai0j0k0
+( i0j0k0   rj0k0)  Ai0j0k0
 (vi0j0    i0j0k00)  bAi0j0k00   (vi0j0    i0j0k0)  bAi0j0k0
 ( i0j0k0   rj0k0)  bAi0j0k0
= (vi0j0    i0j0k00)  (vi0j0    i0j0k0)  ( i0j0k0   rj0k0)
=   i0j0k00 + rj0k0 :
Since (i0; k00) 2 B  S with  2 f1; 2g; we have that  i0j0k00 = pj0 and by assumption
pj0 > rj0k0, ui0+wk0 (bui0+ bwk0) < 0 contradicts (A.14). Assume now that for all i0 2 B1[B2
and all k00 2 S1 [ S2, Ai0j0k00 = 0: By denition, pj0 = minfrj0k j k is such that qj0k > 0g:
Let k 2 S1 [ S2 be such that qj0k > 0 and pj0 = rj0k : By (1), such k does exist. By
(A.17) and the denition of pj0, pj0  rj0k0, a contradiction with the initial assumption that
pj0 > rj0k0. 
Lemma 6 Let M = (B;G;S; V; d; R;Q) be a market and let (u;w) 2 RBRS be such that
there exists a competitive equilibrium price vector p such that for every coalition C  B[S
and any feasible assignment bA SW compatible with C we have thatP
i2BC
ui +
P
k2SC
wk  M(C; bA; p):
Then, (u;w) 2 CE.
Proof Let (u;w) 2 RBRS be a payo¤ of marketM satisfying the hypothesis of Lemma
6 and let A be any optimal assignment of market M: Consider rst any coalition C = fig;
where i 2 B: Observe that A is itself SW compatible with C: Then, by assumption,
ui 
P
(j;k)2GS
(vij   pj)  Aijk: (A.18)
Consider now any coalition C = fkg, where k 2 S: Observe that again A is itself
SW compatible with C: Then, by assumption,
wk 
P
(i;j)2BG
(pj   rjk)  Aijk: (A.19)
Then, P
i2B
ui +
P
k2S
wk = v(B [ S) =
P
(i;j;k)2BGS
 ijk  Aijk:
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By denition of the per unit gains  ijk,P
(i;j;k)2BGS
 ijk  Aijk =
P
i2B
P
(j;k)2GS
(vij   pj)  Aijk +
P
k2S
P
(i;j)2BG
(pj   rjk)  Aijk:
Hence, (A.18) and (A.19) imply that for every i 2 B and k 2 S,
ui =
P
(j;k)2GS
(vij   pj)  Aijk
wk =
P
(i;j)2BG
(pj   rjk)  Aijk;
and consequently, by Lemma 6 in Jaume, Massó, and Neme (2009), for every i 2 B and
k 2 S,
ui = di  i(p)  0
wk =
P
j2G
qjk  jk(p)  0:
Thus, (u;w) = (u(p); w(p)) and by (10), (u;w) 2 CE . 
Theorem 1 Let (u;w); (u; w) 2 RB+RS+ be two payo¤ vectors of market M = (B;G;S; V; d; R;Q):
Then,
((u;w); (u; w)) 2 SW2M if and only if (u;w) = (u; w) 2 CE :
Proof Let ((u;w); (u; w)) 2 SW2M : By Lemma 2, (u;w) = (u; w): By Lemma 5, there
exists a competitive equilibrium price vector p = (p1; :::; pG); with pj  minfrjk j k 2 S
such that qjk > 0g for all j 2 G; such that for any coalition C  B [ S; and any feasible
assignment bA that is SW compatible with C; we have that:P
i2BC
ui +
P
k2SC
wk  M(C; bA; p):
By Lemma 6, (u;w) 2 CEM :
Assume now that (u;w) 2 CE : Then, ((u;w); (u;w)) 2 CE2M : By Proposition 1, ((u;w); (u;w)) 2
SW2M : 
Theorem 3 Let  2 Z+nf0g. Then, there exist a market M = (B;G;S; V; d; R;Q) and a
payo¤ vector (u;w) =2 CE such that (u; w) 2 CoM .
Proof Fix  2 Z+nf0g. Dene M = (B;G;S; V; d; R;Q) as follows: B = fb1g; S =
fs1; s2g, G = fg1g, v11 = 1, r11 = r12 = 0, d1 = 4  1 and q11 = q12 = 2. It is easy to see
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that since the short side of the market is the demand, the unique competitive equilibrium
price is p1 = 0 and CE = f(4  1; 0; 0)g. Consider the payo¤ vector (4  3; 1; 1) =2 CE :We
show that ((4 3); (1; 1)) 2 CoM : Let C be a coalition in market M with #(
S
=1
BC) = 
and #(
S
=1
SC) = : Thus,
   and   2: (A.20)
The value of coalition C is
v(C) =
(
(4  1) if 2  
2 if 2 > 
(A.21)
and P
i2BC
ui +
P
k2SC
wk = (4  3) + : (A.22)
We want to show that for all  and  satisfying (A.20),P
i2BC
ui +
P
k2SC
wk  v(C): (A.23)
Assume rst that C is such that 2  . Then, by (A.21) and (A.22), (A.23) holds if
and only if (4  3) +   (4  1) holds, which follows from 2  .
Assume now that C is such that 2 > . Then, by (A.21) and (A.22), (A.23) holds if
and only if (4   3) +   2 holds. Thus, to show that (A.23) holds is equivalent to
show that
(4  3)  (2  1) (A.24)
holds. By (A.20), the most unfavorable case for which (A.24) holds is when  is larger; i.e.,
 = 2   1. Hence, (A.24) follows if (4  3)  (2   1)(2  1). But this last inequality
can be written as
4  3  4  2   2+ 1;
which holds because    and   1 imply 2  1  . 
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